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Strategies for implementing the new International Health
Regulations in federal countries
Kumanan Wilson,a Christopher McDougall,b David P Fidler c & Harvey Lazar d

Abstract The International Health Regulations (IHR), the principal legal instrument guiding the international management of public
health emergencies, have recently undergone an extensive revision process. The revised regulations, referred to as the IHR (2005),
were unanimously approved in May 2005 by all Member States of the World Health Assembly (WHA) and came into effect on 15 June
2007. The IHR (2005) reflect a modernization of the international community’s approach to public health and an acknowledgement of
the importance of establishing an effective international strategy to manage emergencies that threaten global health security.
The success of the IHR as a new approach to combating such threats will ultimately be determined by the ability of countries to
live up to the obligations they assumed in approving the new international strategy. However, doing so may be particularly challenging
for decentralized countries, specifically those with federal systems of government. Although the IHR (2005) are the product of an
agreement among national governments, they cover a wide range of matters, some of which may not fall fully under the constitutional
jurisdiction of the national government within many federations. This tension between the separation of powers within federal systems
of government and the requirements of an evolving global public health governance regime may undermine national efforts towards
compliance and could ultimately jeopardize the regime’s success.
We hosted a workshop to examine how federal countries could address some of the challenges they may face in implementing
the IHR (2005). We present here a series of recommendations, synthesized from the workshop proceedings, on strategies that these
countries might pursue to improve their ability to comply with the revised IHR.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2008;86:215–220.
Une traduction en français de ce résumé figure à la fin de l’article. Al final del artículo se facilita una traducción al español. .الرتجمة العربية لهذه الخالصة يف نهاية النص الكامل لهذه املقالة

The revised International Health Regulations (IHR) represent a dramatic new
approach to combating public health
emergencies.1 However, the success of the
IHR may be impeded because of problems federal countries may experience in
meeting their requirements.2,3 Founded
on a series of sanitary conventions dating back to the mid 19th century, the
recently revised IHR aim to guide the
response of Member States to public
health emergencies, with a particular
focus on preventing the international
spread of disease without unnecessary
disruption of trade or travel. Recognition of the limitations of previous versions, as well as growing awareness of
the increased threat of infectious diseases in an ever-more interconnected
world, prompted an extensive revision
process which began in 1995 and concluded with unanimous approval of the
new agreement in May 2005.4,5
The IHR (2005) reflect a substantial change in approach to international

health governance, with the protection
of the international community from
public health threats granted priority
over national sovereignty in certain
circumstances.6 Some of the more dramatic examples of this shift in approach
include: new requirements for countries to report on potential public health
emergencies within 24 hours; WHO authority to use nongovernmental sources
of information for surveillance purposes; and the ability of WHO to issue
public health recommendations such as
those regarding travel, with or without
the consent of potentially affected States
Parties.1–3 A further major innovation
in the new IHR is the detailed requirement for States Parties to develop
multilevel capacities (referred to as core
capacity requirements) to effectively
manage public health threats (Table 1).
The revised IHR impose on all WHO
Member States the explicit obligation to
develop, strengthen, and maintain the
capacity to detect, report and respond

to public health events.7 When combined, the required capacities constitute
a blueprint for a comprehensive, fullyintegrated, public health emergency
detection and response system.
The IHR outline “core capacity
requirements for designated airports,
ports and ground crossings”. These requirements should not be problematic
for most federal countries to implement
since international points of entry
normally fall under the jurisdiction of
national governments. Potential compliance problems, however, can emerge
with regard to those core capacities
over which federal governments may
not have explicit jurisdiction. For example, surveillance powers may fall to
the regional (such as state, provincial
or cantonal) level of government in
many federal countries. Federal governments may not have the authority
to implement local level surveillance
or guarantee the transfer of epidemiological data from local to national levels
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Table 1. Core capacities for surveillance and response
Obligations of States
Parties to IHR (2005)

Local level

Core capacities

•

to detect unusual public health
events
• to report key epidemiological
information to relevant
intermediate and national
authorities
• to immediately implement
primary control measures

Points of entry
capacities

•

Cross-cutting
capacities

•

Capacity-building in
low-resource countries

•

Intermediate level

National level

to evaluate and verify
epidemiological data
• to implement additional control
measures as necessary
• to report to national authorities
•

to assess within 48 h all domestic
“urgent events” by consolidating input
from and disseminating information to
relevant sectors of the administration
• to report the results of assessments as
required within 24 h to WHO through
a national focal point (NFP) which
must be accessible at all times for
communications
•

to provide and maintain facilities and expertise to conduct inspection (of goods and conveyances) and interview,
diagnosis and treatment (of travellers) at designated points of entry

to conduct 24 h/7 day surveillance and inspection, reporting, notification, verification, response, and collaboration
with domestic and international public health authorities
• to develop and maintain trained specialized personnel and facilities for health data collection, laboratory investigation
and operational/logistical support (including communication, transportation and supply chain), and detailed national
public health emergency plans that specify multi-sectoral response teams
• to implement the regulations and conduct of public health interventions “with full respect for the dignity, human
rights, and fundamental freedoms of persons” (and as guided by the UN Charter and WHO Constitution)
• to assess existing national capacities to comply with the terms of the IHR (2005) within 2 years (and to achieve full
compliance within 5 years) of the entry into force of the agreement
for WHO and State Parties to assist in the development of public health capacities everywhere, including the
provision of technical cooperation and logistical support, as well as the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate
implementation of the IHR

IHR, International Health Regulations; PHEIC, public health emergencies of international concern.

to meet IHR (2005) requirements.
Compounding matters is the fact that
voluntary compliance from the local
level cannot be presumed due to resource limitations at this level or fear of
economic consequences related to early
reporting of potential emergencies.
The potential difficulty in reconciling federal systems of government with
the IHR (2005) is illustrated by a
request made by the United States of
America for an article declaring that it
would implement the regulations in
a manner that is most consistent with
its federal system of government.8 The
rejection of the USA’s request suggests
that other federal countries did not view
their systems of government as an insurmountable obstacle to implementation
of the IHR (2005).9 To the contrary,
the unanimous approval of the IHR
(2005) by all members of the World
Health Assembly, including its federal countries, is evidence of a global
recognition of the importance of the
agreement as well as of the general willingness of States Parties to take measures
to overcome domestic obstacles to its
implementation.

216

Implementation in federal
countries
Addressing the domestic governance
challenges created by an increasingly
demanding global public health regime
is not a simple task. While all countries
share an interest in addressing global
public health emergencies through the
revised IHR, they differ in important
ways that will have an impact on the
viability of various strategies to implement the agreement. Every country has
a unique governance system, as well as
a legal framework (constitutional or
otherwise) that places limitations on
the design of policies and practices.
Countries also have unique histories,
including experiences with public
health emergencies and acceptance of
national government intervention. In
some federal countries, India for example, it may be considered more acceptable for national governments to
intervene in local issues, particularly if
that intervention brings much needed
resources to manage public health
threats.
No one set of policy options will
be appropriate for all federations. To

determine the appropriate approach for
federal countries, the following fundamental questions need to be answered:
(1) To what extent can federal countries
ensure compliance with the IHR within
the context of a decentralized approach
to public health? (2) If federal countries
adopt more centralized approaches to
public health, how should they manage
the potential negative impacts of such
reforms on their relationships with
regional and local public health authorities? (3) In either case, how coercive are
federal governments justified in being
towards regional governments to ensure
that the coordination of public health
necessary for compliance with the IHR
takes place?

Governance options
To effectively implement the IHR, federal
governments will need to take steps to
either centralize governance, or at the
minimum, increase harmonization of
public health policy and practice at the
level of regional government. The latter
will require creating a structure whereby
regional governments are encouraged to
develop the appropriate local public health

Bulletin of the World Health Organization | March 2008, 86 (3)
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capacity and pass necessary public health
legislation that will allow the country to
meet IHR requirements. Federal governments have different instruments they
can utilize to achieve these goals. These
include direct legislation within the area of
public health, legislation within a parallel
area that covers the matters of interest,
funding arrangements, the use of intergovernmental agreements, and the issuance
of national guidelines. Each of these has
advantages and disadvantages and it is important to identify the combination of instruments that can optimize the likelihood
of successful compliance with the IHR
while mitigating its potential harms
(Box 1).

Legislation
Among the options available to federal
governments, the legislative approach is
likely to be considered one of the most
intrusive, or least respectful, of regional
sovereignty. But it may also be one of
the most effective mechanisms for the
implementation of the IHR (2005).
The ability of a national or federal government to exploit this option will in
many cases depend on the allocation
of powers in the constitution. If the
federal government has clear constitutional jurisdiction, it could pass legislation imposing requirements on local or
regional public health authorities. This
legislation could provide for surveillance
capacity development at the regional
level, compulsory reporting of public
health threats and allow for federal intervention in public health emergencies.
The IHR (2005) decision instrument
for identifying a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)
could be adopted as a federal test for
jurisdiction for the latter issue: if a public health emergency is found to be of
international concern according to the
algorithm contained in the instrument,
then the federal government would automatically have jurisdiction over the
matter. India, for example, has proposed
new legislation that explicitly provides
the federal government with authority
over a WHO-declared PHEIC.
The constitutions of many countries, however, are silent on the allocation of public health powers between
levels of government, with the result in
most cases being concurrent jurisdictional authority for activities related to
the IHR. On the other hand, parallel
constitutional powers often provide

Box 1. Key messages from symposium
Participants in the symposium included senior public health experts from, but not officially
representing, the following: Australia, Canada, China, France (China and France are examples
of decentralized unitary countries), India, the Russia Federation, Senegal (as a general
representative of regional governance in Africa), the United States of America and WHO.
The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of
WHO or participating countries.
Each of the countries involved had uniquely different experiences with implementing the
International Health Regulations (IHR). Australia, Canada and the USA were confronted with the
challenge that authority over several of the core capacity requirements was primarily located
at the state or province level. Each of these countries has potential mechanisms by which
these powers could be centralized, although such a process may be contrary to the history of
federalism within that country and could be viewed as harmful to the integrity of the public health
system.
The intention of these countries is to manage these issues through collaborative approaches
such as harmonization of legislation, funding arrangements and memoranda of understanding.
Brazil, India and the Russian Federation have systems in which necessary legislative authority
exists at the federal level and regional governments are dependent on central governments
for funding, which allows conditions to be attached to funding. These countries have more
governance mechanisms by which to implement the IHR although public health capacity at the
local or regional level remains a critical issue. The representative from Senegal identified the
need for coordination of governance not just within each country but also with adjacent countries
with which borders are often crossed in daily activities and from which diseases could spread.

mechanisms through which federal governments can gain the needed legislative authority. In Canada, for example,
the criminal law power has been used
by the federal government to regulate
in public health.10 In the USA, the
federal government’s tax and spending
powers and its ability to regulate interstate commerce provide the opportunity to extend its influence in many
public health matters.11 The constitutions of some federal countries also contain variations of a “supremacy clause”
whereby conflicts between regional and
federal legislation (including treaty law)
are resolved in favour of federal law.12
The use of these alternative approaches must be considered with particular caution. The expansion of federal authority into an area not otherwise constitutionally enumerated runs
the risk of being viewed as a power
grab, and could damage essential collaborative intergovernmental relationships. Moreover, unilateral assertions of
federal authority, whatever the legal
grounds, are unlikely to be effective in
the absence of regional cooperation,
and could, in the worst case, generate
animosity sufficient to seriously impair responses during a public health
emergency.13 Thus such measures and
approaches should only be considered
once other less intrusive alternatives
have failed, and only when a federal
government judges that its lack of legislative authority poses a significant threat

Bulletin of the World Health Organization | March 2008, 86 (3)

to its citizens or to the international
community.
An intriguing and controversial
approach to establishing a legislative
basis for federal authority to intervene
during public health emergencies is
through the use of security powers. This
is an option that has been considered by
the United States and Australia, which
has recently enacted legislation that
links public health surveillance with
national security.14,15
The securitization of public health
has implications that need to be carefully considered. 16–18 A primary advantage is that it could provide the
federal government with the necessary
powers to take aggressive action early
in a public health emergency. Including
public health as an essential component
of security also raises the profile and
visibility of the former, which may in
turn result in increased resources for
population health. However, securitization is in direct opposition to the fundamental ethos of public health based on
collaboration. It also necessarily makes
public health concerns secondary to
security concerns, and so public health
emergencies could ultimately fall under
the authority of security officials as opposed to public health officials.
Importantly, the consideration of
any legislative approach must also respect
other aspects of a nation’s constitution,
notably human rights provisions. Respect
for human rights is also explicitly made
217
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obligatory under the IHR (2005), which
requires that domestic implementation be
guided by the UN Charter, the WHO
Constitution, and “with full respect for
the dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms of persons”.19

Funding power
Ultimately legislative authority at the
federal level is meaningless without
necessary capacity at the regional or local
levels. Moreover, strengthening public
health capacity to meet the requirements of the IHR (2005) will require
significant resource commitments in
most countries. One way to achieve
enhanced capacity, while ensuring that
local and regional authorities transfer
relevant public health information to
national governments, is through conditional funding arrangements. These
would most likely involve agreements
between federal and local or regional
governments to share the costs of developing surveillance infrastructure in
exchange for guaranteed transfer of
epidemiological information to the national level. From a political perspective,
such an arrangement may be viewed as
less intrusive than a legislative approach.
It also has the potential to achieve the
same or better results on the ground,
particularly when there is a large financial asymmetry between national and
regional governments. However, some
regional governments may still regard
the attachment of conditions to federal
dollars as coercive and could potentially
restrict the optimal use of these dollars
at the local level. This is particularly true
in developing countries dealing with
the burden of multiple public health
threats, such as HIV, tuberculosis and
malaria, which they are already insufficiently resourced to manage.

Intergovernmental agreements
Another less intrusive option than legislation is the creation of formal negotiated
agreements between different levels of
governments. These would be mutually
agreed upon and would therefore respect
jurisdictional boundaries. Memoranda
of Understanding (MOU) could be particularly effective for issues such as data
transfer and could be used to formalize
funding arrangements. They might also
establish the level of authority the federal
government would have in the event of a
regional public health emergency of possible national or international concern.
218
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Canadian federal and provincial authorities have been considering the use of an
MOU related to data transfer, based on
the PHEIC algorithm proposed in the
decision-making instrument in Annex 2
of the IHR (2005). Australia has developed an intergovernmental agreement
to outline the mechanism by which an
emergency will be declared.20 However,
in the absence of additional funding arrangements or compensation plans, such
agreements could be difficult to enforce.
Tensions are likely to arise when regional
governments are faced with the actual
decision to report a public health emergency which could risk damage to the
local economy. One approach to diffusing
such tensions would be to pursue intergovernmental agreements for the creation
of independent bodies to oversee public
health activities (during emergencies and
otherwise) that could act at arms’ length
of government. The degree of autonomy
of such organizations will be dependent
upon the legislative framework within
which they must operate as well as the
source of their funding.

National guidelines
Another minimally intrusive approach
is the creation of national guidelines
with regard, for example, to the standardization of data collection, storage
and reporting. Regional and national
data standardization remains a major
obstacle in most countries, where there
is a need to develop compatible, if not
fully-integrated, information technology platforms for the collection, analysis and communication of information
during a public health emergency.
Guidelines, while not binding, could be
used to encourage such harmonization
and could lead to increased cooperation from local governments if they are
invited to participate in the process of
guideline formulation. Another advantage of guidelines, as compared to
legislation, is that they can be rapidly
modified to remain current with changing technologies and evolving public
health science and practice. Guidelines
are most likely to be effective if used in
combination with another strategy, in
particular conditional funding arrangements. For example, the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act in the
USA provides an example of how
federal funding to states can be made
contingent on meeting federal standards.21

Conclusion
We have presented several governance
strategies that federal countries could
consider when determining how to
comply with the revised IHR (summary
in Table 2). Our recommendations are
intended for federal governments but
may also be useful for decentralized
countries with unitary systems of government. While in these countries the
central government always has a legislative option, the importance of maintaining effective collaborative relationships
should encourage the consideration of
other approaches.
There is no single solution to the
challenges faced by federal States Parties
to the revised IHR. In all likelihood,
a combination of strategies based on
specific circumstances will have to be
developed for each country. However, a
couple of over-arching themes emerged
from the proceedings of our workshop.
First, we expect the greatest challenges
to occur in meeting the surveillance,
reporting and response requirements of
the IHR. The revised IHR require that
a single body within every country has
the responsibility to communicate to
WHO about potential PHEIC. Assuming this will be a federal agency, the most
effective mechanism by which to ensure
it has the required information would
be to incorporate the Annex 2 decision
instrument either into legislation or an
MOU between federal and regional
governments. If and when a potential
PHEIC is detected, the federal agency
must possess sufficient authority to assess and acquire all available pertinent
information so as to meet the IHR
reporting requirements. Second, ongoing challenges such as surveillance at the
local level are likely to be handled better
through more collaborative approaches
that combine conditional funding to
develop capacity with intergovernmental
agreements to formalize relationships
and responsibilities. National guidelines
could be used for matters in which standardization of practices is sought.
Whatever the combination of strategies used, their ultimate success will
depend crucially on the development
of appropriate public health capacity
at all levels of government, as well as
effective working relationships between
the various stakeholders. Furthermore,
devolution of public health activities
or powers to nongovernmental entities,
for example in the form of privatization,
can make agreements between govern-
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Table 2. Summary of governance strategies
Governance
strategies
Legislation

Advantages

Disadvantages

Potential area of use

enforceable
clear designation of roles and
responsibilities
• clear lines of accountability

•

dependent on existence of
appropriate constitutional authority
• may damage relations with other
levels of government
• inflexible

•

enforceable
links capacity development to
governance strategy
• respects constitutional boundaries

•

may be changed unilaterally by
national government
• may be viewed as coercive
• creates some ambiguity as to
accountability

•

surveillance capacity development
in combination with meeting IHR
reporting requirements

•
•

authority to oversee and guide
response to a PHEIC
• mechanism to ensure transfer of
epidemiological data to national level

Funding
arrangements

•
•

Agreements

•

respects constitutional boundaries

•

limits to enforceability

•

mechanism to ensure transfer of
epidemiological data to national level

Guidelines

•
•

respects constitutional boundaries
flexible

•

least enforceable

•

standardization of data

IHR, International Health Regulations; PHEIC, public health emergencies of international concern.

ments meaningless and threatens to
undermine compliance with the IHR
by limiting the ability of countries to
gather and aggregate public health
information.22,23 Any implementation
strategy that does not take these factors
into serious consideration is likely to

be ineffective in promoting compliance
with the IHR (2005). ■
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Résumé
Stratégies de mise en œuvre du nouveau règlement sanitaire international dans les Etats fédéraux
Le Règlement sanitaire international (RSI), principal instrument
juridique guidant la prise en charge internationale des urgences
de santé publique, a récemment fait l’objet d’un processus de
révision approfondi. Le règlement révisé, appelé RSI (2005), a été
approuvé à l’unanimité en mai 2005 par tous les Etats Membres
de l’Assemblée mondiale de la Santé (WHA), puis est entré en
vigueur le 15 juin 2007. Le RSI (2005) reflète la modernisation de
l’approche de la santé publique par la communauté internationale
et la reconnaissance de l’importance d’une stratégie internationale
efficace pour faire face aux situations d’urgence qui menacent la
sécurité sanitaire mondiale.
Le succès du RSI, en tant que nouvelle approche pour
combattre ces menaces, sera conditionné en dernier ressort par
la capacité des pays à s’acquitter des obligations auxquelles ils
se sont soumis en approuvant la nouvelle stratégie internationale.
Néanmoins, respecter ces obligations risque d’être particulièrement
difficile pour les pays décentralisés, notamment ceux dotés d’un

système fédéral de gouvernement. Si le RSI (2005) est le fruit
d’un accord entre gouvernements nationaux, il couvre une grande
variété de questions, dont certaines ne relèvent pas totalement
du gouvernement national dans nombre de fédérations. Cette
tension entre la séparation des pouvoirs au sein des systèmes
de gouvernement fédéraux et les exigences d’un régime de
gouvernance sanitaire mondiale en évolution pourrait saper
les efforts au niveau national pour respecter le règlement et
finalement remettre en cause le succès de cette gouvernance.
Nous avons accueilli un atelier chargé d’examiner comment
les Etats fédéraux pourraient répondre à certaines de difficultés
qu’ils risquent de rencontrer dans l’application du RSI (2005).
Nous présentons dans cet article une série de recommandations,
formulées à partir des actes de l’atelier, sur les stratégies que
pourraient suivre ces pays pour améliorer leur capacité à respecter
le RSI révisé.

Resumen
Estrategias para aplicar el nuevo Reglamento Sanitario Internacional en los países federales
El Reglamento Sanitario Internacional (RSI), que constituye el
principal instrumento jurídico disponible para dirigir la gestión
internacional de las emergencias de salud pública, ha sido
objeto recientemente de un extenso proceso de revisión. El
Reglamento revisado, conocido como RSI (2005), fue aprobado
por unanimidad en mayo de 2005 por todos los Estados Miembros
Bulletin of the World Health Organization | March 2008, 86 (3)

de la Asamblea Mundial de la Salud y entró en vigor el 15 de
junio de 2007. El RSI (2005) refleja el enfoque más moderno que
aplica a la salud pública la comunidad internacional, así como el
reconocimiento de la importancia que reviste el establecimiento
de una estrategia internacional eficaz para controlar las
emergencias que amenazan la seguridad sanitaria mundial.
219

Policy and practice
International Health Regulations implementation strategies

El éxito del RSI como una nueva perspectiva para combatir
esas amenazas dependerá en último término de la capacidad
de los países para cumplir las obligaciones que asumieron al
aprobar la nueva estrategia internacional. Sin embargo, ello
puede representar una tarea especialmente ardua para los países
descentralizados, sobre todo para los que cuentan con sistemas
federales de gobierno. Aunque es fruto de un acuerdo entre
gobiernos nacionales, el RSI (2005) abarca una amplia gama de
asuntos que pueden quedar fuera de la jurisdicción constitucional
del gobierno nacional en muchas federaciones. Ese conflicto entre
la separación de poderes que se da en los sistemas federales de
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gobierno y las exigencias de las nuevas formas de gobernanza de
la salud pública mundial puede minar los esfuerzos nacionales
encaminados a garantizar el cumplimiento de las medidas
propuestas y a la larga podría poner en peligro el éxito de esas
medidas.
Organizamos un taller para estudiar de qué manera podrían
los países federales afrontar algunos de los desafíos que puede
plantear la aplicación del RSI (2005). Presentamos aquí una serie de
recomendaciones, sintetizadas a partir de lo discutido en el taller, sobre
las estrategias que podrían adoptar esos países a fin de mejorar su
capacidad para cumplir lo dispuesto en el RSI revisado.

ملخص

 فرغم أن اللوائح الصحية الدولية.البلدان ذات الن ُُظم الحكومية الفيدرالية
 فإنها تغطي طيفاً واسعاً من، هي نتاج االتفاق بني الحكومات الوطنية2005
 بعضها قد ال يندرج تحت الترشيعات الدستورية للحكومات الوطنية،القضايا
 وقد يؤدي هذا التوتر بني انفصال القوى ضمن.ضمن الكثري من الفيدراليات
الن ُُظم الفيدرالية للحكومة وما تتطلبه الن ُُظم املستجدة للحكامة يف الصحة
العمومية العاملية إىل إضعاف الجهود الوطنية الرامية اىل االمتثال للوائح
.الصحية الدولية وقد تهدد بالتايل نجاح نظامها
وقد استضاف القامئون عىل هذه الدراسة حلقة عملية لدراسة كيف
ميكن للبلدان الفيدرالية مواجهة بعض التحديات التي قد تواجهها يف تنفيذ
 ويعرضون يف هذه املقالة سلسلة من،2005 اللوائح الصحية الدولية
التوصيات التي جمعت من وقائع الحلقة العملية حول االستـراتيجيات التي
قد تتبعها هذه البلدان لتحسني قدرتها عىل االمتثال للوائح الصحية الدولية
.املن َّقحة

استـراتيجيات تنفيذ اللوائح الصحية الدولية يف البلدان الفيدرالية

تعد اللوائح الصحية الدولية األداة القانونية األساسية التي تسرتشد بها اإلدارة
 وقد خضعت مؤخراً هذه،الدولية للطوارئ التي تتهدد الصحة العمومية
 وأصبحت اللوائح املنقحة تعرف باللوائح،اللوائح إىل عملية مراجعة شاملة
 وقد حازت عىل موافقة جميع الدول األعضاء يف،)2005( الصحية الدولية
 ودخلت حيز،2005 مايو/جمعية الصحة العاملية بدون استثناء يف شهر أيار
 وهي تعكس السامت العرصية،2007 يونيو من عام/ حزيران15 التنفيذ يف
لألسلوب الذي ينتهجه املجتمع الدويل يف الصحة العمومية مع اعتـرافه
بأهمية توطيد استـراتيجية دولية فعالة إلدارة الطوارئ التي تهدد األمن
.الصحي عىل الصعيد العاملي
إن نجاح اللوائح الصحية الدولية كأسلوب جديد يف مواجهة مثل هذه
التهديدات هو أمر ستحدده مقدرة البلدان عىل الوفاء بااللتزامات التي
 إال،قطعتها عىل نفسها لدى موافقتها عىل االستـراتيجية الدولية الجديدة
 والسيام،أن تنفيذ ذلك سيكون بحد ذاته تحدياً للبلدان البعيدة عن املركزية
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